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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------------STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,

••

Plaintiff-Respondent,

••

••

-v-

••

D. JOHN MUSSELMAN and
LINDA ANN CORAM,

••

Defendants-Appellants.

Case No. 18161

••

••

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a rehearing on the appeal of
defendant-appellant, D. John Musselman from a denial by the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County , State of
Utah, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding, of defendants motion
to set aside a default judgment entered against him.

DISPOSITION
The lower court denied the motion of the
defendant-appellant to set aside the default judgment on the
grounds that the defendant-appellant's proposed answer failed to
state a defense and thereafter entered its order accordingly.
The lower court made no finding or ruling, whatsoever, on
issue of excusable neglect.

th~

This honorable court issued a per

curiam opinion on July 26, 1982 affirming the District Court's
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ruling.

On October 8, 1982 this honorable court granted

defendant's petition for rehearing of the matter.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent, again, seeks a judgment and order
affirming the denial of defendant-appellant's motion to set aside
the default judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts (as previously submitted) are
restated for the purpose of this rehearing.
Linda Ann Coram obtained a Medicaid grant from the
State of Utah, Department of Social Services, whereby she
received the benefit of a total sum of $82,522.22 paid by the
State of Utah to her medical providers all of which payments
allegedly resulted from improper treatment by her doctor.

She

assigned to the State the right to recover as against any liable
third party these medical expenses and in 1979 the Utah
Legislature enacted the Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Section
55-lSd-l through 17 (re-enacted in 1981 as Section 26-19-1
through 17), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

(Complaint

and proposed answer.)
Defendant-appellant was retained in 1979 to represent
Linda Ann Coram in a malpractice action against the doctor who

-2-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

allegedly caused the need for the Medicaid grant which resulted
in a pre-trial settlement of $150,000.00.

Prior to proceeding

with the case, defendant-appellant contacted the State of Utah,
Office of Recovery Services and inquired as to the State's
Medicaid claim of $82,522.22 and thereafter agreed to collect
said sum out of any recovery, taking for his services the
statutory 25% contingency fee.

When the case was settled, the

insurance carrier issued two settlement drafts; one was in the
sum of $67,477.78; payable to Linda Ann Coram, her husband and D.
john Musselman (defendant-appellant); the other was in the sum of
$82,522.22 (the exact cmount of the State's Medicaid claim), and
was payable to Linda Ann Coram, her husband, D. John Musselman
and the St-ate o-f Utah Office -of-Recovery· Services (emphasis
added).

Both drafts were issued on February 5, 1981.

in the sum of $82,522.22 shows endorsements as follows:
Ann Coram," "William Dyerl Coram,"

0

The draft
"Linda

D. John Musselman" and "State

of Utah Off ice-- of Recovery Services by;· - D; --John Musselman· its
Attorney at Law and in Fact."

(Emphasis added).

Affidavit in

Opposition of Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Transcript of
Hearing of August 18, 1981).
The draft of $82,522.22, hereinafter called "settlement
draft, 0 was deposited by defendant-appellant in Bank Account No.
71-31544-3 in the name of D. John Musselman and Associates at the
Central Bank and Trust Company, Riverside Plaza Office, Provo,

-3-
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Utah, on or about March 10, 1981, from which account funds were
taken by D. John Musselman and loaned or otherwise used by him.
The sum of $50,000.00 was loaned out of this same banK account to
Vernon Herbst of Blackfoot, Idaho, on April 15, 1981, by means of
check no. 160, drawn on said Account No. 71-31554-3, whereby said
Vernon Herbst executed a promissory note which carried interest
at the rate of 180% per annum (15% per month) and secured the
promissory note with a deed of trust in which D. John Musselman
was the named beneficiary.

The state did not authorize the

diverting of its funds obtained from the said settlement draft of
$82,522.22.

(Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to Set Aside

Judgment and Affidavit on Order to Show Cause).
Numerous letters were written to defendant-appellant,
demanding payment to the state of the money recovered in the
settlement draft and after many promises to account were not
kept, the plaintiff-respondent filed a lawsuit, No. C-81-4425, in
the District Court of the Third Judicial District, County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah.

(Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to Set

Aside Judgment.
After defendant-appellant was served summons and copy
of said complaint, on June 4, 1981, he promised to account to
plaintiff-respondent for said settlement draft funds which
promises he failed to keep.

On July 5, 1981, defendant-appellant

talked on the telephone to a Mr. George Martindale, Investigator

-4-
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for the Office of Recovery Services, and was advised by Mr.
Martindale that unless he made an immediate accounting to the
State of Utah for the settlement draft funds or filed a
responsive pleading, the attorney for the State of Utah in Case
No. C-81-4425 would have to default him.

(Affidavit in

Opposition of Motion to Set Aside Judgment).
No communication was ever received from defendantappellant therafter and a default certificate was entered on the
9th day of July, 1981, and jugment by default was granted and
docketed on July 14, 1981.

(Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to

Set Aside Judgment, Default Certificate and Judgment by Default).
On August 13, 1981, defendant-appellant filed a motion
to set aside the judgment and noticed said motion for argument on
the 18th day of August, 1981, at 2:00 o'clock p.m.

The court

ruled that notice of the motion did not comply with the rules as
to time and, therefore, ruled that defendant-appellant would have
to renotice his motion to set aside the judgment.

(Transcript of

August 18, 1981, p.7, lines 7 through 11).
A hearing on a supplementary order was set for the same
day before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor and defendant-appellant

was then and there sworn under oath to answer questions
concerning the disposition of the settlement funds.

He admitted

under oath the fee arrangement and acknowledged his endorsement
of the settlement draft as the •Attorney in Law and in Fact"
.
_,.

-5-
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of
.

the State of Utah Off ice of Recovery Services but thereafter
took the Fifth Amendment on all other questions regarding the
~

funds obtained from the settlement draft.

(Transcript of Hearing

on August 18, 1981).
Defendant-appellant was ordered to appear on the 3rd
day of November, 1981, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. before the court of
the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, Utah, in Civil
Case No. C-81-4425, to then and there show cause, which order to
show cause was supported by an affidavit.

Defendant-appellant

did not file a counter-affidavit, nor did he offer to counter any
of the statements in the supporting affidavit by sworn testimony.
(Motion, Affidavit and Order to Show Cause).
The motion of defendant-appellant to set aside the
default judgment was not noticed up on November 3, 1981, when the
order to show cause was heard by the Honorable G. Hal Taylor;
however, counsel for plaintiff-respondent agreed to waive the
notice requirement and the court thereafter heard oral argument
on the motion to set aside the judgment from both counsel.

Upon

conclusion of the oral argument, the court denied the motion of
defendant-appellant to set aside the default judgment on the
grounds that the purported answer did not state a defense and
entered its order accordingly, from which order defendantappellant appeals.

(Transcript of Hearing of November 3, 1981).

-6-
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This Honorable Court on July 26, 1982, ruled in a
per curiam decision that the holding of the lower court should be
affirmed.

Thereafter defendant-appellant petitioned this court

for a rehearing of the matter claiming that this honorable court
had misconstrued the facts and issues at hand and that defendantappellant should be allowed a second hearing on the matter.

The

State of Utah therefore submits this brief on rehearing.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This case comes before this Honorable Court on a
rehearing based upon the allegations of the defendant-appellant
that this court materially misconstrued the actions of the lower
court and the factual situation existing in this case.
Defendant-appellant claims that his failure to timely answer the
complaint filed against him by the State of Utah was excusable
and that he tendered a meritorous defense to the complaint filed
against him by the State of Utah.

It is the position of the

State of Utah that this court was correct in its initial holding
and a close examination of the record in the court below will
sustain that original holding.

The defendant-appellant now

claims that the controlling facts of the case (to which the court
below found he had no defense and which decision this court
previously sustained) were "neither • • • admitted or conceded by
the defendant." An examination of the record of the Third

-7-
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Judicial District Court will prove that the factual situation
existing did· ·not require

the defendant-appellant to admit or
~

concede any material facts; these being matters which are all
clearly evident and uncontroverted in the record on file herein.
From the outset of this case defendant-appellant has
maintained that there are only two issues involved in this case
which the court should take into consideration those being: 1.
Was the conduct of the defendant excusable in failing to timely
answer the complaint which the State was forced to file against
him for failuire to account for funds collected on the State's
behalf?

2.

Was there a viable defense available to the

defendant to the complaint filed against him by the State of
Utah?
It is the position of the State of Utah that an
examination of the record will show that 1.

the defendant's

failure to timely answer the complaint filed against him by the
State of Utah was not excusable (which issue is not properly
before this court) and that 2.

there is no meritorious defense

which the-defendant may rely upon against the complaint filed
against him by the State of Utah.

However, the ruling of the

lower court did not require a decision or finding as to No. 1,
above, since it ruled as a matter of law that based on the facts
in the record the defendant did not prof er a valid defense to the
allegations in the complaint.

-8-
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The brief of defendant-appellant on rehearing fails to
address any issues not heretofore presented before this honorable
court in defendant-appellant's prior briefs.

Defendant-appellant

in attempting to present some kind of a meritorious defense has
employed a myriad of arguments presented in an obscure, and
alternative array, many of which actually contradict each other •
This production of weak if not insipid and redundant attempts at
defenses should not deter this honorable court f rorn examining
what actually happened in the court below, what was actually
stated, under

~ath~

by the defendant-appellant and supported by

unopposed affidavits all of which was the basis for the ruling of
the lower court.

POINT I
THE DEFENDANT BY HIS ACTIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS TO THE STATE WAS ACTING AS A
REPRESENTATIVE, AND LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH.

The defendant-appellant: claims that he at no time
admitted to the fact that he was representing the State of Utah
in the civil action of Ms. Coram against her personal physician.
That defendant-appellant in this appeal denies that he was, in
fact, representing the State of Utah in this instance does not
alter the facts as they appear on the record.

The original

complaint filed by the State of Utah against the defendant in its
first cause of action states:
-9-
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•That there is no contract between the State
of Utah and defendant, D. John Musselman
providing for payment of an attorney's fee to
said defendant by plaintiff for a recovery of
the said Eighty-two Thousand Five Hundred
Twenty-two and 22/100 Dollars ($82,522.22)
lien claim and that plaintiff is, therefore,
entitled to recover the entire sum of Eight
Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty-two and
22/100 Dollars ($82,522.22).•
In defendant's answer to these allegations as found
upon page 30 of the record before this court the defendant denied
paragraph 9 of the State's complaint.

A denial of the fact that

no contract existed between the State of Utah and the defendant
would be an assertion that in fact a contract did exist between
the parties.

Further in a letter from the defendant to the

Office of Recovery Services dated February 3, 1981 addressed to
George Martindale the defendant stated:
"The total claim of the State of Utah is
ascertained by deducting from $82,522.22 the
statutory 25% for attorney's fees which would
total $20,630.56, which would leave a claim
for the State of Utah of $61,891.66, minus
the proportionate share of costs attributable
to the State. I believ~ the costs at this
time would reduce that figure to something in
the neighborhood of $59,000.oo.•
This letter is on page 43 of the record before this
court.

In every subsequent letter on record before this court

the defendant makes mention of the attorney's fee which the State
of Utah is expected to pay·him for his legal servicesi expecting
fully one quarter of the recovery due to the State of Utah under

-10-
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the assignment of benefits to the State of Utah by his other
client, Linda Ann Coram.

These material representations and

claims, in and of themselves, are clear proof that the defendant
represented himself as being the legal counsel for the State of
Utah in this particular recovery.
Even more convincing than the representations of the
defendant which he made (as to this attorney-client relationship)
to the members of the Department of Social Services, Off ice of
Recovery Services of the State of Utah, and to his other client
Linda Ann Coram, is the representation of being the State's
attorney which he made to the insurance company of Doctor Boston
(the defendant in the original medical malpractice suit) that he
was in fact the attorney representing the State of Utah.

On the

reverse side of the actual draft in settlement of this assigned
claim of the State of Utah (R.52) is written:
D. John Musselman
State of Utah
Office of Recovery Services by: D. John
Musselman
Its:

Attorney at law and in fact

This settlement draft was the object of close
examination in the court below (R.120-122) in which the defendant
a-dmitted that he did -sign- the drafts and did withhold the
settlement -amount which he accepted as a representative of the
-11-
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State of Utah, Department of Recovery Services.
It is the position of the State of Utah that the
defendant cannot deny that he was acting as the

legal~counsel

for

the State of Utah in the recovery of the assigned medicaid claim
in the legal action taken against Dr. Boston.

It is clear on the

face of the record that representations made by the defendantappellant to the

Depart~ent

of Social Services Off ice of Recovery

Services of the State of Utah when preparing to take legal action
and thereafter that he undertook, as the State's attorney, the
recovery of the medicaid claim and that by admissions before the
court below that he did, in fact, sign the settlement draft as
the representative and attorney of the State of Utah, Department
of Recovery Services. Therefore, he need not formally admit,

llQ.I.

may -be· deny the fact that he was acting as attorney for the State
of Utah and that he owed a fiduciary obligation to his client,
the State of Utah, in this matter. The facts in the record speak
for him.

It is also unnecessary for the defendant to admit the

fact that after negotiating and obtaining from the said draft the
sum of Eighty-two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty-two and 22/100
Dollars ($82,522.22) in the name of the State of Utah as
settlement of an assignment of Benefits claim from his other
clients (Mr. and Mrs. Coram), he intentionally withheld and
misused those funds to his own personal gain.

-12-
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The brief of the defendant-appellant is an insult to
the intelligence and the integrity of this court and is a last
gasp attempt by the defendant to avoid facing the consequences of
his actions.

POINT II
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT BY THE
COURT BELOW WAS NOT BASED UPON EITHER
SPECIFIC PLEADING OF THE COMPLAINT.
In defendant's brief it is alleged that because of the
amount of the judgment against defendant that the judgment of the
court could only be based upon one of the two causes of actiQn
filed in the original complaint (R.2-5).

This is an incorrect

assumption upon the part of the defendant, the trial court having
the discretion to rule upon the causes of action individually and
grant whatever judgment it deemed fit.

Because the amount prayed

for in the first cause of action was the amount awarded by the
court, defendant assumes that this is the only cause of action
ruled on by the court.

This is a misinterpretation of the record

and the facts in this case.

Nowhere on the record does the

court specifically exclude the plaintiff-respondent's second
cause of action, nor does it rule only on the first cause of
action.

The court's initial judgment was one of default for

reasons of defendant's failure to timely answer the complaint
against him.

Upon hearing in the court below on the 3rd day of
~·
'

-13-
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.~ ~

.

November, 1981, defendant orally requested the court to set aside
the judgment to which the court stated (R.111)
I have read your proposed answer and I don't
think it states any defense. Motion to set
aside the default is denied.

The court never addressed the issues of the complaint
individually but only held that the defendant failed to state a
defense which would merit the setting aside of the judgment
(R.87)

The original default judgment (R.9) stated only that
the State of Utah would be awarded a certain sum of money, that
sum being the amount requested in the first cause of action.
However if this honorable court will examine that judgment and
the following documents on the record before this court, it will
find that there was no specific ruling on either of ·the causes of
action listed in the complaint of the plaintiff-respondent and

therefore defendant's allegations that the first cause of action
is the only controlling issues is fallacious in nature.
POINT III
THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PURSUE ITS
ASSIGNMENT OF BENEFITS CLAIM AGAINST MRS.
CORAM IS ANCILLARY TO THIS CASE
A good deal of defendant's brief is taken up in
discussing the merits and statutory requirements concerning the
rights of the State of Utah against his former clients, Mr. &
-14-
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Mrs. Coram.
hand.

This discussion has little bearing on the case at

The issue which is squarely before this court is whether

the defendant by signing the settlement draft as "the attorney at
law and in fact" for the State of Utah after making
representations to departments of the State of Utah that he was
acting as the attorney for the State and that he expected the
statutory fee of 25% of the recovery as his attorney's fees,
[which incidently he still maintains in argument I B(S) page 18
of his brief on rehearing before this court,] was in violation of
his fiduciary duty to the State of Utah in withholding the above
stated funds and thereafter misappropriating those funds for his
own personal benefit.

The court below recognized that the

pleadings of the defendant to this end were merely delaying
tactics which stated no actual defense to the charges leveled
against him.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INADVERTENCE AND
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT IS WITHOUT MERIT
In the motion to set aside the judgment made before the
court below and every subsequent attempt to set aside that
judgment the defendant-appellant has claimed that because of a
medical condition [from which the defendant-appellant alleges he
was suffering] he inadvertently failed to answer the complaint
filed against him by the State in the time required by statute.
'

-15-
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Rule 55A(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states
the elements of a default judgment.

Rule 3B of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure states the time on which the allotted number of
days begins to run, that being the time of service upon the party
defendant to the suit.

Rule 12A of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure states that 20-days shall be allowed after service of a
complaint for the reply of the party defendant to said complaint.
After this statutory period of time has run under Utah law a
default judgment may be entered against the party defendant at
any time as provided by Rule 55A(l) above.

The summons required

by the above stated statutory rules of civil procedure was served
on the 4t-h day of June, 1981 by Deputy Sheriff Vest (R.7).
Thereafter defendant had-20 daysi

as allowed by the above stated

rules to file an answer to the complaint which was filed against
him by the State of Utah.

An examination of the calendar for

June of 1981 will disclose that statutorily the defendant was
-reguir·ed to fi-le his· answer by ·the· 24th of June, 1981 (a
Wedesday).

At any point thereafter the State of Utah would have

been justified in defaulting the defendant.

In the brief of the

defendant-appellant (Page 5) he states that on approximately June
29, 1981, he was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital, Provo,
Utah, for severe stomach ailment.

This admittance to the

Hospital was on an emergency basis and it can be assumed that up
and until this point and time the defendant was fully capable to

-16-
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carry on his business affairs.

From the return of service above

stated on the record before this court the defendant had failed
to reply to the complaint of the State of Utah before being
admitted to the hospital for his stomach condition.

Therefore,

the defendant cannot in good faith claim that excusable neglect
or inadvertance caused him to fail to reply to the complaint of

the plaintiff's in the time allotted by the statute, he being
admitted to the hospital on the fifth day after

the statutory

period of time for filing of his answer had run and another
twelve days elapsed after his release from the hospital in which
to file a responsive pleading.

The record indicates that the

defendant was stalling for time and that he continued to stall
for time to collect on his "investment of the $50,000.00 and

with the collection of this principal sum and interest of
$7,500.00 a month from April 14, 1981, he hoped to pay off the

state's claim before any of these sordid facts came to light.

CONCLUSION
The uncontroverted facts in the record before this
court show that the defendant by his representations to employees
of the Department of Social Services and the Off ice of Recovery
Services of the State of Utah, by his demand for the statutorily
allowed 25% attorney's fees for the recovery, and, finally, and
the most convincing, his signature upon the settlement draft as "

-17-
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attorney at law and in fact• for the State of Utah, had a
fiduciary duty to the Off ice of Recovery Services and the State
of Utah to pay over the settlement funds of the formally executed

,,•'

assignment of benefits of Mrs. Coram to the Department.

;;.

His

acquisition of the funds as the State's attorney and misuse of
those funds for his own personal benefit, which-are-·all clearly
established by the record in· the court below, are the issues
squarely before this court.

His position in this case, as was

recognized by the court below, is indefensable, and, therefore,

···:
.....

the decision of the court below to deny his motion to set aside

...1,
.. .

the default judgment was proper and should be upheld by this-

~

·-

court.
The defendant's only claim before the court below to

..........

support his motion was that of inadvertance and execusable

.....

neglect.

-:-···
.....

As has been demonstrated by the plaintiff-respondent,

~~:

the statutory period of time allowed under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure for an answer after the date of service upon the
defendant had run many days, both prior to the defendant's
unfortunate, and sudden medical condition and thereafter before
the entry of the default judgment.

The defendant can not in good

faith claim that his medical condition was the reason for his
failure to answer the complaint filed against him by the State of
Utah his medical problem accounting for only four of the twenty
days beyond the defaulting period) and, therefore, even the claim

-18-
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of excusable neglect is totally without defense or justification
in this matter.

One can only surmise and draw conclusions, based

on the foregoing established facts, that defendant-appellant's
failure to join issue and thereby open the door of discovery and
the consequences from such inquiry was weighed by him against the
chances of recovery of the $50,000.00 with accrued interest and
the subsequent settlement with his client the State of Utah
(which would have closed the door on any litigation and discovery
on the misuse of the recovery funds, and he chose to gamble on
the latter and lost.

The record in this conclusion speaks for

itself.
The decision of the court below to deny the defendant's
motion to set aside the default judgment was, as can be clearly
ascertained by a review of the record before this court,
justified and therefore this court should, on the basis of the
foregoing facts and the law peviously cited, affirm the decision
of the lower court as it did previously.
Dated this _-_,~lo_____ day of December, 1982.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
LEON A. HALGREN
Assistant Attorney General

.
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